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This paper reports on the results of two field experiments examining the impact of 
providing information on how a consumer’s own electricity use translates into its monthly 
electricity bill on how that consumer responds to a nonlinear retail price schedule for electricity.  
Across the two utilities, over 2,000 consumers participated in a customized on-line interactive 
educational program that taught them how their monthly electricity bill was determined from 
nonlinear retail price schedule they face.  Each consumer was also told where their typical 
consumption monthly places it on this nonlinear pricing schedule.  Consumers were also shown 
how changes in their major electricity-consuming activities would affect their monthly bill under 
the nonlinear price schedule.  Using data from before and after this intervention for consumers 
that took the educational program (our treatment) and a randomly selected set of control 
consumers, we estimate the overall treatment effect associated with our educational program as 
well as a treatment effect for consumers on each specific pricing tier on the nonlinear price 
schedule during the pre-intervention period.  For both utilities, we find that the overall impact of 
our treatment is a reduction in the consumer’s daily average consumption.  In addition, our price 
tier-specific treatment effect results are that consumers that learn they face a higher marginal 
price for consuming electricity reduce their electricity consumption and consumers that learn 
they face the lowest marginal price increase their electricity consumption.  These results 
emphasize that the need to provide timely and actionable information to consumers in order to 





 Virtually all residential electricity customers in the United States face an increasing block 
tariff (IBT) pricing structure where the price paid for an additional unit of consumption, what is 
typically called the marginal price, varies with the amount of electricity consumed within the 
month.  An IBT pricing structure allow consumers to purchase their “necessary” monthly 
electricity consumption at a low marginal price and then charges consumers progressively higher 
marginal prices for more discretionary electricity uses.  Under an IBT, electricity consumers that 
use more kilowatt-hours (KWhs) during the month face a higher marginal price, and therefore 
should have stronger incentive to reduce their monthly consumption relative to consumers that 
use less KWhs during the month and therefore face a lower marginal price. 
 There are a number of necessary conditions for IBT pricing to provide these incentives.  
First, consumers must know how their monthly electricity bills are determined from an IBT.  
Second, consumers must determine where on the IBT schedule they are likely to end the month 
in order to determine the appropriate marginal price to use for their electricity consumption 
decisions during the month.  Third, and perhaps most important, consumers need to understand 
how their electricity-using actions translate into KWhs of electricity consumption, because 
depending on where the customer is on the nonlinear price schedule the cost of a given electricity 
consuming action can differ by more than a factor of two for many IBT schedules. 
Electricity demand is derived from a consumer’s demand for air conditioning, space 
heating, water heating, lighting, television watching, computer use, and use of electricity-
consuming appliance services in general.  Although most consumers are able to predict the dollar 
amount of their typical summer and winter monthly electricity bills based on previous 
experience, there is considerable debate among industry observers whether:  (1) consumers 
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understand how their electricity bills are determined from an IBT, (2) what their marginal price 
for the month is likely to be, and (3) how their appliance-using actions translate into KWhs of 
consumption and dollars on their monthly electricity bill.   
For example, suppose a consumer did not know how much electricity it was likely to 
consume in the month.  Even if a consumer understood how his monthly bill was computed 
under IBT pricing, he would not know the marginal price of electricity for that month and would 
therefore be forced to use less efficient approaches to managing his monthly electricity bill.  Shin 
(1985) argues that lack of information about the monthly marginal price (the marginal price for 
the last KWh consumed in the month), may lead consumers to adopt rules of thumb for 
determining their monthly electricity consumption.  Shin postulates that consumers respond to 
the monthly average price—the consumer’s monthly electricity bill divided by his monthly 
electricity consumption.  Shin then presents empirical evidence consistent with this hypothesis.  
Borenstein (2009) argues that lack of information about the monthly marginal price, because the 
consumer cannot accurately forecast his monthly electricity consumption, causes him not to 
respond to the monthly marginal price.  Ito (2012) proposes an empirical test of whether 
consumers respond to the monthly marginal price versus the monthly average price and finds 
evidence consistent with the hypothesis that consumers respond to the monthly average price. 
Possible explanations for the empirical results of Shin (1985) and Ito (2012) are that 
consumers are unaware of their monthly marginal price or they do not understand how their 
monthly electricity bill is determined from an IBT or how their electricity-consuming actions 
translate into dollars on their monthly electricity bill.  By providing consumers with this 
information, one would expect them to make more efficient electricity consumption choices, 
rather than resort to ad hoc decisions rules for determining their monthly electricity consumption.  
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 This study employs a randomized field experiment to study whether consumers that are 
provided with information about their monthly marginal price and how this price impacts their 
monthly electricity bill change their behavior.  We provide customers in our treatment group 
with: (1) information about how their electricity bill is determined from an IBT pricing function, 
(2) the value of their typical monthly marginal price, and (3) information about how their 
appliance-using actions translate into dollars on their monthly electricity bill.  Our hypothesis is 
that consumers can respond to IBT pricing structures and other more complex retail pricing 
structures such as hourly retail prices that vary with hourly wholesale prices, but they often lack 
the information that would allow them to do so.  Our experiment provides empirical evidence 
that our on-line educational treatment provides the basic information that allows consumers to 
respond to an IBT pricing structure. 
 Starting in the Spring of 2011, we partnered with two California electric utilities and 
implemented a field experiment with consumers from each utility that resulted in roughly 2,000 
consumers taking our Internet educational course that provided with them with the minimum 
information necessary to respond to an IBT pricing structure.  At each of the two electric 
utilities, we were provided with a random sample of residential customers.  We randomly 
assigned the vast majority of these customers to the intent-to-treat (ITT) group and the remaining 
consumers to the control group.  All customers in the ITT group received an encouragement 
letter or e-mail inviting them to complete our treatment, a 30-minute Internet educational course 
that provided the consumer with:  (1) information about how its electricity bill is determined 
from its IBT pricing function, (2) the value of its typical monthly marginal price of electricity, 
and (3) information about how the customer’s appliance-using actions translate into dollars on its 
monthly electricity bill. 
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After completing the Internet course, we tracked the changes in electricity consumption 
for the ITT group, which is composed of consumers that were offered the opportunity to take our 
educational course but refused (the offered-but-refused-treatment group) and consumers that 
were offered the opportunity to take the course and actually took it, and the control group.  
Besides estimating the treatment effect of our intervention across all consumers, we also specify 
a measurement framework that allows the treatment effect of our education program on 
electricity consumption to differ by the level of the consumer’s typical monthly marginal price.  
This econometric approach is justified by an appeal to the static theory of consumer utility-
maximizing choice subject to an IBT presented in Section 2 which implies that the level of this 
marginal price should impact a consumer’s electricity consumption choices.  
For both utilities, the overall the average treatment effect for our educational program is 
negative, implying that on-average customers that took our treatment reduced their consumption 
relative to customers in our sample that did not take the treatment. We also estimate pricing-tier-
specific treatment effects regressions for our educational program. Consistent with the view that 
customers armed with information about their typical monthly marginal price will use this 
information to use electricity more efficiently, we find that customers that learn they face a 
higher marginal price for electricity reduce their consumption while customers that learn that 
they face the lowest marginal price for electricity increase their consumption.   
This result is consistent with the view that the consumers that do not complete our 
treatment (those in the control group or offered-but-refused group) are using rules-of-thumb 
based on their average price of electricity to determine their monthly electricity consumption.  
Those that complete our on-line educational course and are provided with information that their 
marginal price is less than this average price decide to consume more and those that find their 
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marginal price is above this average price decide to consume less.  Both of our utilities assess a 
monthly fixed charge for providing service, so consumers whose marginal price is the first price 
step on the IBT face a marginal price that is less than their average price.   A unique feature of 
our study is that we ran the same experiment at two independent locations and obtained 
qualitatively the same results at both locations.  There are also crucial differences across the two 
utilities in terms of their IBT pricing structures, climate conditions and the type of data, which 
strengthens the case for our results being valid for other utilities where customers pay according 
to IBTs.  
 This paper adds to an emerging literature on educating consumers about non-linear 
incentives such as the tax code and evaluating the impact of providing this information on 
consumer behavior.  Chetty and Saez (2013) assess the impact of tax preparers giving simple, 
personalized information to a random sample of their clients about the Earned Income Tax Credit 
(EITC) on the subsequent earnings of these clients.   Liebman and Luttmer (2011) use a field 
experiment to document how information about the Social Security system impacts older 
women’s labor force participation. 
This literature and our field experiments assess the impact of lowering the cost of 
information acquisition on economic behavior.  In our case, the on-line educational course 
lowers the cost to the consumer of learning the information that will allow it to respond to an 
IBT for electricity. In the case of Chetty and Saez (2013), their treatment lowers the cost to the 
taxpayer of learning about the incentives to work created by the EITC.  In both cases the 
information is randomly assigned to individuals and then a statistical model is used to test for a 
behavioral change in response to the provision of this information.  Because both experiments 
assume that the only reason for the differences in the behavior of the treatment and control 
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groups is due to the information provided, it is therefore reasonable to assume that any change in 
behavior between the treatment and control groups is caused by the information provided.  In our 
case, making consumers aware of their monthly marginal price, how their monthly electricity bill 
is determined under an IBT, and how their monthly bill varies with changes in their electricity-
consuming activities appears to cause changes in their monthly electricity consumption in a 
manner consistent with these consumers making beneficial use of this information. 
Although our results are directly relevant to the impact of information provision on the 
behavior of consumers subject to IBT pricing structures, it does not seem to be a stretch to 
extend them to case of marginal prices that differ over time.  Specifically, our results suggest that 
notifying consumers that they face an hourly price that is higher than their annual average retail 
price will cause them to reduce their consumption and notifying consumers that they face an 
hourly price that is lower than their annual average retail price will cause them to increase their 
consumption.   This logic is also consistent with the results of Wolak (2010), which uses an 
experiment to study how residential consumers respond to retail electricity prices that vary with 
hourly wholesale prices. Wolak (2010) presents evidence of substantial demand reductions in 
response to high hourly retail prices and documents that even low-income consumers are adept at 
responding to the higher hourly prices.  These results highlight how appropriate price signals 
combined with timely information provision can play a key role in making more efficient use of 
the existing electricity industry infrastructure.  
2. 	Impact	of	Marginal	Price	Information	
To understand how notifying consumers of their typical monthly marginal price is likely 
to impact their electricity consumption, consider the following two models of utility-maximizing 
consumer-level electricity consumption behavior.  The first assumes linear pricing where the 
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consumer faces the same marginal price for all units consumed and the second assumes nonlinear 
or IBT pricing where the consumer pays higher marginal prices for higher levels of monthly 
consumption.   For simplicity, we assume that the consumer faces an IBT for electricity with two 
pricing tiers and a monthly fixed charge, F.  For consumption between zero and E1 the consumer 
faces a marginal price of p1. For consumption greater than E1 the consumer faces a marginal 
price of p2 that is strictly greater than p1.   
Suppose that the consumer is only told its monthly electricity bill is B dollars and that its 
consumption is E KWhs.  Suppose that based on this information, the consumer concludes that it 
faces a price of pA ≡ B/E for electricity.  Assume the consumer has a budget constraint of M 
dollars and that the only other good available to the consumer is a composite good X, that has a 
price of pX.  The consumer’s preferences are assumed to be described by the utility function, 
U(E,X), which is increasing in each argument.   
Consider the following simple model of customer-level electricity consumption subject to 
a linear price of electricity set equal to the average price faced by the consumer, pA.   In this case 
the consumer’s utility maximization problem is: 
Max{E,X} U(E,X) subject to pX X + pA E = M 
If E* and X* are the solutions to this problem then they satisfy the following first-order 
condition: UX(E*,X*)/pX = UE(E*,X*)/pA, where US(E*,X*) is the partial derivative of U(E,X) 
of with respect to S for S=E,X evaluated at (E*,X*).  
Suppose that E* > E1, which implies that p1 < pA < p2 , because pA =  (p2 max((E – E1),0) 
+ p1 min(E1,E) + F)/E.  Now suppose that the consumer receives our information treatment and 
is notified that its monthly marginal price is p2 and that it faces an IBT.  In this case, the 
consumer’s utility-maximization problem is: 
Max{E,X} U(E,X) subject to pX X + p2 max((E – E1),0) + p1 min(E1,E) = M - F. 
If E+ and X+ are the solutions to this problem then they satisfy the following first-order 
condition:  UX(E+,X+)/pX = UE(E+,X+)/p2 because the consumer has been told that p2 is its 
monthly marginal price.  Note that because p2 > pA, UE(E*,X*)/pA > UE(E*,X*)/p2, which implies 
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that E+ < E*, if we make the usual assumption that UE(E,X) is decreasing in E and increasing in 
X and UX(E,X) is decreasing in X and increasing in E (the marginal utility of X is decreasing in 
X and increasing in E).  This result implies that telling a consumer that formerly thought it was 
maximizing utility subject to a linear price equal to the average price of electricity that it is 
facing a IBT and has a marginal price of p2 > pA, will result in that consumer reducing its 
electricity consumption.  By similar logic, telling the consumer it faces an IBT and a marginal 
price of p1 < pA will result in that consumer increasing its electricity consumption.
1  We test these 
hypotheses about the impact of providing this information using the field experiment that we 
describe in the next section.  
3. Field	Experiment	Implementation	Steps	
To conduct this field experiment, we partnered with two California electric utilities.  For 
confidentiality reasons, we never accessed data that identified the consumer’s name or street 
address.  However, by partnering with these electric utilities we were able to access consumer-
level data on electricity consumption before and after our intervention took place for a large 
random sample of consumers from each utility and a subsample of the consumers from each 
utility that have taken our educational program. 
We now describe how we implemented this field experiment and recruited a subject pool 
and provide a summary of the educational course’s content. Our two field experiments were 
accomplished in several steps.  First, we chose a random subset of two electric utility’s 
residential customers.  Second, we randomly assigned these customers to the intent-to-treat 
group and the control group.  Third, we randomized a participation payment amount offer to 
each member of the intent-to-treat group.  Fourth, we invited each member of the intent-to-treat 
group to take our on-line education course with the promise of the randomly assigned payment 
amount in an Amazon.com gift code if they completed the course.  Fifth, a subset of consumers 
                                                 
1 Note that even with only two pricing tiers, pA, is greater than p1 because customers must pay a F, the monthly fixed 
charge, regardless of how much they consumer, that make the average price of customers on the first pricing tier 
greater than p1.  
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in the intent-to-treat group chose to complete our on-line course to become members of our 
treatment group.  At both experimental sites, the enrolled subjects took the same educational 
treatment tailored to the specific IBT that the customer faced.  Sixth, we tracked the post-
treatment electricity consumption for the intent-to-treat group (the treatment group and the 
offered-but-refused group) and the control group.   These panel data allow us to estimate the 
econometric models we present below. We now provide details about each of these steps. 
 
Utility A Experiment Specifics 
 
 Utility A provided a third party with the confidential data for 1,407,500 single family 
homeowners in its service area.2  This third-party had to be provided with the name and street 
address of each of these homeowners because it sent out the invitation letters that we describe 
below. These consumers all faced the most common residential rate structure used by Utility A. 
This third party was employed to guarantee data confidentiality.  It created a unique 
customer identifier and provided data to us only using this identifier.  This procedure guaranteed 
the privacy of all customers in our treatment group and control group.  From the population of 
Utility A single-family residential customers, 25,000 customers were drawn at random.  The 
control group received no correspondence from us. 
Each member of the intent-to-treat group was randomly assigned one of the following 
Amazon Gift Card Amounts:  $10, $20, $25, $30, $35, and $50.   The third-party incorporated 
this information in the invitation letter that was sent out to each member of the treatment group.  
We use this consumer-specific randomized payment amount as an instrument for the decision of 
a consumer to take our treatment to compute a local average treatment effect for our educational 
program. 
                                                 
2 The sample provided by Utility A includes single family residences, domestic tariff only, continuously on a 
domestic rate for one year, no tariff riders such as an air conditioning cycling program and no reduced payment 




The third-party mailed out 7,500 invitation letters on July 29th 2011, an additional 3,000 
letters on August 17th 2011 and a final batch of 2,500 letters on September 23rd 2011.  Below, we 
will present our statistics on who chose to participate and how this propensity varies with the size 
of the Amazon Gift Card offered.  
The subset of consumers that took our treatment logged into an Internet website and used 
a customer-specific ID (rather than their name) and password to login.  Their customer ID and 
password were provided in their invitation letter. Once participating individuals logged in, they 
received customized information about their electricity consumption that we describe below and 
they answered a set of survey questions.  Figure 1 gives a sample screenshot from our education 
program showing the IBT for an inland customer of Utility A.  The grey shaded area under the 
curve shows how much the customer must pay for amount of energy shown on the horizontal 
axis under this IBT. 
Upon finishing the Internet Education Program, each customer was e-mailed the 
promised Amazon gift card and a printable file that could be posted in a prominent place in the 
customer’s residence containing a set of tips for reducing the customer’s electricity bills 
customized based on the consumer’s answers to a number of survey questions.3  At this point, 
those in the treatment group did not interact with us again.   
Utility B Specifics 
While the general content and intent of the Internet Education Program was identical at 
both sites, there are some important differences in how we implemented the experiment at Utility 
B relative to the Utility A.  In choosing the treatment group and control group, we selected a 
random sample of single-family homeowners that had an electronic account with Utility B.   
                                                 
3 The third-party handled the processing of the Amazon Gift Cards so at no point did we have access to treated 
customers’ e-mail addresses.  The third-party also e-mailed the customized electricity conservation tips. 
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Such customers receive their communications from the utility via e-mail rather than through the 
United States Postal Service. According to Utility B, roughly 20% of residential customers have 
electronic accounts.  We were told by Utility B that these customers are a bit younger and more 
ethnically diverse than the utility’s overall service population.  We focused our experiment on 
this population of Utility B customers because of cost considerations.  The marginal cost of 
sending an e-mail asking a customer to take our treatment is virtually zero versus almost a dollar 
per letter for contacting a customer by regular mail. 
The Utility B experiment population is composed of all electronic account customers that 
had an interval meter (that records the customer’s hourly consumption) installed as of the 
Autumn of 2011.  At that time, roughly 50% of the Utility B’s customers had interval meters 
installed. The interval meters were installed by geographic territories within the utility’s service 
area and the roll out of these meters was completed by April 2012.  We recognize that these 
selection rules mean that we do not have a random sample of single-family homeowners in the 
service area. Instead, our sample is randomly drawn from the population of customers that had 
electronic accounts and whose geographic area had smart meters in place as of Autumn 2011.   
We followed the same steps at Utility B that we did at Utility A to assign customers 
randomly to be in our sample and then randomly assigned this group to the intent-to-treat group 
and the control group.  For those assigned to the treatment group, we randomly assigned Amazon 
Gift Card payments of $0, $10, 20, $20, $30, $40 and $50 to all treatment group customers for 
completing the course.  A $0 Amazon amount meant that we sent a solicitation e-mail asking 
them to take the course without any promise of a financial payment. 
On October 18th 2011, we launched the Utility B experiment by sending out the 
solicitation e-mails with randomly assigned Amazon amounts, including a solicitation e-mail 
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with no promise of payment.  On October 26th 2011 another 4,500 emails were sent out to those 
who did not open the first e-mail.  After a customer completed our on-line education program, 
the third party e-mailed the customer their Amazon Gift card and the customized electricity 
consumption tips.  The third party worked with Utility B to provide us with anonymous 
customer-level electricity consumption data with an anonymous numerical identifier assigned to 
each customer in the intent-to-treat group and control group.  
Table 1 gives the details of the experiment design for the Utility A and Utility B 
experiments.  The breakdown for the intent-to-treat, treatment, and control groups reflects that 
fact that data errors after receiving the final data from Utility A and Utility B required deleting a 
number of customers from each of the three groups.  Table 2 gives a breakdown of the treatment 
acceptance rates for each Amazon Gift card amount for each experiment.  For both experiments, 
the null hypothesis of an acceptance probability that is monotone increasing in the Amazon Gift 
card amount offered cannot be rejected. 
4. Valid	Randomization	and	Potential	Endogenous	Selection	
 
` This section analyzes pre-intervention data on monthly consumption from Utility A and 
monthly consumption from Utility B aimed at demonstrating:  (1) our procedure for randomizing 
customers into the intent-to-treat (ITT) group and the control group is statistically valid and (2) 
that the pre-intervention distribution of consumption for customers in the ITT sample that took 
the treatment is no different from the pre-intervention distribution for those that did not take the 
treatment. 
 Our analysis relies on the two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of equality of two 
distributions.   Specifically, let  equal the average daily consumption of customer i of type k 
during month m, where k denotes one of four groups:  ITT, control, treatment, and ITT-declined 
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(the customer is in the ITT group but declined to take the treatment).   We express all monthly 
consumption in terms of average daily consumption during that month to account for the fact that 
there are different numbers of days during different months of the year.   
Suppose there are M months during the pre-intervention period, which ends during the 
month that first letter was send out in the case of Utility A and the month the first e-mail was 
sent out in the case of Utility B.  Suppose there are Nk customers in group k.  Define the 
empirical distribution of average daily consumption in month m for group k as: 	 ∑  ≤ t), 
where   is an indicator variable that takes on the value 1 if X is less than or equal to t 
and zero otherwise. Under the assumption that the , i=1,2,…,Nk are independent and 
identically distributed within month m for each group k with population distribution equal 
to	 , we can perform the hypothesis test: :		 	 	   versus		 :		 	 	 , 
using the two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic  
KS = 		 |	 	 |. 
Table 3A reports the KS statistic and the associated probability value (p-value) for month m for 
the test that the population distribution of average daily consumption for month m for the control 
group is equal to the population distribution of average daily consumption for month m for the 
ITT group during the pre-intervention period for Utility A.   The p-value gives the probably of 
obtaining a draw from the null asymptotic distribution of the test statistic greater than the 
realized value of the KS statistic.  The table also gives number of observations in both the ITT 
and control groups.   For the months January to July of 2011, the probability value is never less 
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than 0.05, indicating that a size α = 0.05 test of the null hypothesis would not be rejected for any 
of these months during the pre-sample period.   
Table 3B reports the KS statistic and the associated probability value (p-value) for month 
m for the test that the population distribution of average daily consumption for month m for the 
treatment group is equal to the population distribution of average daily consumption for month m 
for the subset of the ITT group that declined treatment for Utility A.  The table also gives 
number of observations in both the treatment and ITT-but-declined-treatment groups.    For the 
months of January to July of 2011, the probability value is never less than 0.05, indicating that 
the null hypothesis would not be rejected for any of these months during the pre-sample period.   
 These results provide no evidence against the null hypothesis that the average daily 
consumption distributions for each month of the pre-intervention period for the ITT sample and 
control sample are equal and no evidence against the null hypothesis that the average daily 
consumption distributions of the treatment and ITT-but-declined-treatment groups are equal 
during each of the month of the pre-intervention period.   These results provide evidence 
consistent with the hypothesis that Utility A customers did not self-select into the treatment 
group based on their pre-invention consumption levels. 
 Table 4A repeats the analysis in Table 3A for Utility B for the months of May to 
September of 2011.  Because of metering errors and other data recording problems throughout 
our sample period for Utility B, there were different numbers of customers in the control and ITT 
groups for each month.  Because the data we obtained from Utility B was during its transition 
from monthly metering to interval metering for the customers in our sample, there were many 
measurement errors and data recording problems that were never resolved.   These problems did 
not arise for Utility A, because we had access to billing quality data for the entire sample period.  
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Nevertheless, the results in Table 4A provide no evidence against the null hypothesis that the 
pre-intervention distributions of average daily consumption for the control group and the ITT 
group are equal for the months of May to September 2011. 
 Table 4B repeats the analysis in Table 3B for Utility B for the months of May to 
September 2011.  For the reasons described above, there are different numbers of customers in 
the treatment group and the ITT-but-declined-treatment group each month.  Different from the 
case of Utility A, there is substantial evidence against the null hypothesis of equality of the two 
distributions for the majority of months of the pre-intervention period.   However, we are unable 
to determine if data errors is primary the reason for the p-values below 0.05 for a number of the 
months, or if the two monthly distributions are in fact different. 
 Taken as whole, the results of this section suggest that our randomization of customers 
into the ITT and control groups is statistically valid for both Utility A and Utility B.  In addition, 
the pre-intervention distributions of average daily consumption for the treatment and ITT-but-
declined-treatment groups were the same for all months during this time period for Utility A, and 
that the KS statistics provide evidence against this null hypothesis for Utility B, but it is unclear 
if this result is being driven by data issues or failure of null hypothesis to hold. 
 The next section summarizes the basic features of our educational program and the three 
key pieces of information that it conveys to customers that should cause them to become more 
efficient consumers of electricity. 
5. Internet	Educational	Treatment	Specifics	
 
The basic goal of the Internet Education Course was to familiarize the individual with the 
three pieces of information described earlier:  (1) the customer’s typical monthly marginal price, 
(2) how the customer’s bill was determined from its IBT, and (3) how the customer’s monthly 
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electricity bill changes in response to changes in how the customer uses its electricity-consuming 
appliances. 
The survey was organized in three sections.  Section 1 demonstrates how the customer’s 
monthly bill is determined from the IBT and where the customer’s monthly consumption is 
typically located on the schedule during the three months before each survey was administered.  
This section also shows how the customer’s marginal price of electricity and monthly bill change 
depending on how much electricity is consumed in the month.  Section 2 surveys the 
customer about the characteristics of its home and the appliances in it.  Section 3 uses the 
answers provided in Section 2 to determine how changes in the utilization of these appliances 
would impact the customer’s monthly electricity bill and provides information tailored the 
customer’s appliance stock to assist them in becoming more sophisticated electricity consumers.  
Specifically, the likely monthly bill increase or decrease associated with changes in these 
customer’s major electricity consuming actions given the customer’s current marginal price are 
presented. 
 
Differences in IBT Pricing Between the Two Utilities 
Figure 2 displays the IBT for Utility A for the inland and coastal portion of its service 
area.  This is the dominant rate structure for single family homeowners in its service territory, the 
lowest marginal price is 12 cents per kWh and the highest is 31 cents/KWh.  The only difference 
between the IBT for the coastal and inland areas for Utility A is the length of each price step.  
Because of the more extreme temperatures in the inland region of Utility A’s service territory, 
the length of each pricing step in the IBT is longer for the inland versus coastal region. 
Customers in the intent-to-treat group that took our Internet course were presented with 
their IBT schedule and shown the locational of their typical month’s usage in KWhs and the 
dollar cost of this typical monthly consumption.   The graphic in the on-line education program 
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would demonstrate that the monthly bill was the area under the IBT up to the customer’s typical 
monthly consumption.  The program also gave participants access to a slider that allowed them 
to conduct their own thought experiments to see how their monthly bill would change if they 
increased or decreased their monthly consumption. 
Figure 2 demonstrates that the two electricity retailers in our study differ sharply with 
respect to the steepness of their pricing tiers. Utility A has five pricing tiers with marginal prices 
that differ by almost a factor of three from the lowest to highest-priced tier.  As shown in Figure 
2, the other retailer, Utility B, has only two pricing tiers, and the top tier is slightly more than 50 
percent higher than the price on the first tier. These differences in the IBT between the two 
utilities allows us to implement a more robust test of whether information on a customer’s 
typical monthly marginal price yields the anticipated behavioral response described in Section 2. 
Data 
This section discusses the data the utilities have provided to us.   For both utilities, our 
unit of analysis is a customer/month.  For Utility A, we have billing cycle level-data that we 
converted to average daily electricity consumption data for each month of our sample starting in 
July 2010 and running through June 2012.  For both utilities, we assumed that the treatment took 
place day the first letter was send for Utility A or the day the first e-mail was sent for utility B.  
For Utility A, we use data for 6 months before the treatment and 6 months after the treatment. 
Although we had hourly billing cycle-level data available for Utility B, for comparability 
with the results for Utility A, we converted this data to average daily values for each month of 
our sample period, similar to how the data used for Utility A.  Different from the Utility A setup, 
we use this average daily consumption monthly data for 5 months before and after the first e-
mail was sent. 
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For both Utility A and Utility B, we also re-ran our analysis with the treatment dates for 
customers in the treatment group set equal to the actual date they took the treatment rather that 
the first day a letter was mailed for Utility A or the first day an e-mail was sent for Utility B and 
obtained very similar results to the ones reported below. 
6. Econometric	Modeling	Framework	and	Empirical	Results	
 
This section presents our treatment effect and tier-specific treatment effects econometric 
modeling framework that we use to estimate the impact of our informational intervention on the 
customer’s electricity consumption for each utility.  We then present results of our model 
estimation for both Utility A and Utility B for the control and ITT (treatment plus ITT-but-
declined-treatment) sample.  We obtain very similar results to those reported below when we use 
the treatment plus the control sample and exclude the ITT-but-declined-treatment customers 
from the sample.   However, we report treatment versus control and ITT-but-declined-treatment 
ordinary least squares results below so that they can be compared to the local average treatment 
effect (LATE) estimates that we present using the ITT indicator variable as instrument for the 
Treatment indicator variable.  The LATE estimator can only be computed for the combined ITT 
and control sample. 
Let Qim equal the average daily electricity consumption in month m for customer i.  This 
data is constructed from the customer-level billing cycle-level data by computing an average 
daily consumption for each billing cycle and then taking a weighted average of the average daily 
consumption of each billing cycle in month i, where the weights are the shares of the days of the 
month i associated with each billing cycle.   For example, if a month has 30 days and 20 of them 
are in one billing cycle and the remaining 10 are in the next billing cycle, then the weights are 
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2/3 and 1/3.  Let Treat(i) equal 1 if customer i is in the treatment group and 0 for all other 
customers. 
Rather than attempt to model how a customer’s consumption of electricity varies across 
months in the sample, we instead decided to estimate all of our treatment effects off of the cross-
section of differences between average daily consumption after the intervention versus before the 
intervention.  Define as the mean average daily consumption for all months during the pre-
intervention time period for customer i.   Define as the mean average daily consumption for 
all months during the post-intervention time period for customer i.  Define Yi = -		 , 
which is the difference between average daily consumption during the post-intervention period 
minus the average daily consumption during the pre-intervention period for customer i. 
In terms of this notation our overall treatment effect model is: 	 	 ∗ 	 , 
where β	is	the	overall	average	treatment	effect.			Our tier-specific treatment effects model for 
tier j assumes: 	 	 ∗ 	 ,  
where βj is the treatment effect for customers typically on tier j.  We estimate βj by restricting 
our sample to customers whose typical pre-intervention consumption was on tier j   The pre-
intervention typical consumption price tier is computed for all customers in both the control and 
ITT samples, but only customers in the treatment group are told this information during our 
educational program.  We estimate the same two models for Utility B.  The only difference is 
that Utility B only has two pricing tiers, so we estimate two tier-specific treatment effects.   
We also estimate these equations by instrumental variables using the instrument ITTi, 
which equals 1 if customer i is in the ITT sample—it receives a letter asking it to take the 
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treatment in the case of Utility A or an e-mail asking it to take the treatment in the case of Utility 
B.  ITTi equals zero if customer i is in the control group and therefore did not receive a letter in 
the case of Utility A or an e-mail in the case of Utility B.  We estimate both the overall treatment 
effect equation and the tier-specific equations using ITTi as an instrument for Treat(i).  Using the 
full set of indicator variables for the Amazon gift card—6 indicator variables for Utility A and 7 
indicator variables for Utility B—interacted with the value of ITTi yields parameters estimates 
for the overall and tier-specific local average treatment effects that are very similar to the ones 
presented below for the single indicator variable ITTi for both Utilities. 
Because our treatment effects model is simply estimating the difference in means of Yi, 
the difference between the post-intervention versus pre-intervention average consumption, more 
informative graphical presentation of the results is possible.  Figure 3 plots the histogram on Yi 
for the treatment sample and the histogram of Yi for the control and ITT-but-declined-treatment 
sample.  The distribution of Yi for the treatment sample is almost a uniformly negative shift 
across all percentiles of the distribution of Yi for the control and ITT-but-declined-treatment 
sample.  The regression result in Table 5-1 demonstrates that the average treatment effect 
associated with our educational program is precisely estimated to be -0.723 KWhs per day.   
Figures 4-1 to 4.5 plot the histograms on Yi for the treatment sample and the histogram of 
Yi for the control and ITT-but-declined-treatment sample for each of the five pricing tiers.  
Consistent the logic of Section 2, for the first pricing tier, distribution of Yi, pre- versus post-
intervention daily-average consumption difference, is a slight positive shift relative to the 
distribution of Yi for the control and ITT-but-declined-treatment sample.   Table 5-1 confirms 
that the tier-specific treatment effect of our educational program for the first tier is precisely 
estimated to be 0.136 KWhs per day. For the remaining 4 tiers, the treatment distribution of Yi is 
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an increasingly negative shift relative to the distribution of Yi for the control and ITT-but-
declined-treatment sample.  Table 5-1 shows that these tiers specific treatment effects are all 
precisely estimated to be negative and range from -0.461 KWhs per day for Tier 3 to -1.201 
KWhs per day for Tier 5. 
Table 5-2 reports the local average treatment effect estimate and tier-specific local 
average treatment effect estimates using the indicator variable ITTi as an instrument for Treat(i). 
The instrumental variable estimates are significantly larger in absolute value that the 
corresponding estimates reported in Table 5-2.   It is important to bear in mind that the sample 
the overall and tier-specific local average treatment effect can be written as: 
LATE = [E(Yi | ITTi=1) – (E(Yi | ITTi=0)]/E(Treat(i)=1 | ITTi = 1), 
for the sample analogues to these population conditional expectations.  This expression points to 
two possible explanations for the significantly larger in absolute value estimate of the local 
average treatment effects in Table 5-2 versus Table 5-1.  First, although the difference between 
the mean of Yi for the ITT sample versus the control sample is negative and roughly the same 
order of magnitude as the difference between the mean of Yi for the treatment sample versus the 
control plus ITT-but-declined-treatment sample, from Table 2 E(Treat(i)=1 | ITTi = 1) = 0.12 for 
the entire sample, so that this difference is divided by 0.12 to produce the LATE.  Second, the 
fact that a customer received our letter asking them to take our education program may have 
caused them to reduce their consumption of electricity, because the letter (reproduced in  
Appendix A) emphasizes that the educational program will help the customer reduce its 
electricity consumption.  This difference in parameter estimates emphasizes the well-known 
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result that the instrumental variables estimate and ordinary least squares estimates of a slope 
coefficient rarely are consistent for the same population magnitude.4 
Figure 5 plots the density of Yi for the treatment group and the control plus ITT-but-
declined-treatment samples for Utility B.  Again, the treatment density appears to be a negative 
shift of the control plus ITT-but-declined-treatment density.   The coefficient estimate in Table 
6-1 confirms that the treatment effect of our educational program for Utility B is -0.328 KWhs 
per day, although this point estimate is not precisely estimated. Figures 6-1 and 6- 2 plot the tier-
specific density comparisons for Utility B.   Consistent with the logic in Section 2, the Tier 1 
treatment density for Yi appears to be a positive shift of the control plus ITT-but-declined-
treatment density and the Tier 2 treatment density for Yi is a larger negative shift.  The parameter 
estimates in Table 6-1 find a precisely estimated Tier 1 treatment effect of our educational 
program of 0.670 KWhs per day and a more precisely estimated Tier 2 treatment effect of -1.922 
KWhs per day. 
Similar to the case of Utility A, the local average treatment effects shown in Table 6-2 
are larger in absolute value than the corresponding coefficient estimates reported in Table 6-1. 
However, the LATE coefficient estimates in Table 6-2 are not estimated with sufficient precision 
to draw any firm conclusions about their magnitude. 
Although the coefficients for Utility B are not as precisely estimated as those for Utility 
A, the signs are consistent with the view that our educational program provides useful marginal 
price information that allows the customer to become a more sophisticated consumer. Although 
in the aggregate, customers reduced their electricity consumption in response to this marginal 
price information, our results suggest that customers on the lowest marginal price tier responded 
to this information by increasing their consumption.  As discussed in Section 2, if customers are 
                                                 
4 Reiss and Wolak (2007) provide detailed discussion of this point. 
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using rules of thumb to determine their monthly electricity consumption based on an average 
price computed from their total monthly bill and total electricity consumed, providing marginal 
price information is likely to have this response.  
7. Conclusion		
 
In co-operation with two California electric utilities, we have designed and implemented 
an educational field experiment to quantify how increased knowledge about nonlinear pricing 
and the customer’s appliance use translates into electricity use impacts the customer’s electricity 
consumption. 
Our experiment demonstrated that providing information to customer about the IBT they 
face and where they are on that schedule can help electric utilities reduce residential electricity 
consumption and reduce greenhouse gas emissions.  The average daily consumption of 
customers for both utilities during our sample periods for both utilities is approximately 25 
KWh.   Our overall treatment effect of -0.724 KWh per day for Utility A is approximately 3 
percent of average daily consumption, whereas the overall treatment effect for Utility B is -0.328 
KWh day which is approximately 1.5 percent of average daily consumption.     
Our findings emphasize that the timely provision of actionable information to final 
electricity consumers is crucial to smart grid technology delivering economic benefits to 
electricity consumers. The “smart grid” has been touted as mechanism for reducing electricity 
bills, increasing energy efficiency, and reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from the 
electricity sector. Residential electricity consumption accounts for roughly 33% of total 
electricity consumption in the United States (US) and the electricity sector produces 
approximately 40% of US GHG emissions.  Consequently, if smart grid technologies can 
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produce modest reductions in customer-level electricity consumption, particularly during periods 
of peak electricity demand when GHG-emissions-intensive generation units must be relied on to 
produce electricity, this can yield tangible reductions in US GHG emissions. 
That consumers are responsive to marginal prices when informed through our treatment 
supports the claim that by accompanying the universal deployment of interval metering at 
California’s three large investor-owned utilities with dynamic retail pricing and the timely 
provision of actionable information to customers on these pricing plans will induce significant 
behavioral changes that reduce both annual and peak-period electricity consumption, which 
would also reduce California’s annual GHG emissions.   Customers with interval meters that are 
also provided with information on the hourly retail price electricity and their real-time electricity 
consumption and understand how electricity-using actions translate into dollars on their monthly 
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Table 1:   Experiment Design for Utility A and Utility B 
Experimental Design Utility A
Intent-to-Treat Group Size 
(Invited) 
12,273 customers 
Treatment Group Size (Invited 
and Accepted) 
1,227 customers 
Control Group Size 10,964 customers 
1
st
 Letter Sent August 1, 2011 
2
nd
 Letter Sent August 18, 2011 
3
rd
 Letter Sent September 26, 2011 
Period of Analysis 2/1/2011 to 1/31/2012 
(monthly data) 
 
Experimental Design Utility B
Intent-to-Treat Group Size 
(Invited) 
5,715
Treatment Group Size (Invited 
and Accepted) 
785
Control Group Size 1,000
1
st
 E-mail Sent October 18, 2011 
2
nd
 Letter Sent October 26, 2011 











Table 2:   Treatment Response Rates for Utility A and B 
 
 







Sent/Offered % Standard 
Error % 
10 700 34 4.90% 0.82% 
20 3437 283 8.20% 0.47% 
25 3161 291 9.20% 0.51% 
30 3053 298 9.70% 0.54% 
35 2949 299 10.10% 0.55% 
50 200 22 11.00% 2.21% 
Overall 13500 1227 9.10% 0.25% 
 







Sent/Offered % Standard 
Error % 
0 1800 108 6.00% 0.56% 
10 1500 181 12.10% 0.84% 
20 1100 142 12.90% 1.01% 
30 900 150 16.70% 1.24% 
40 700 121 17.30% 1.43% 
50 500 83 16.60% 1.66% 










Table 3:   Kolomogorov-Smirnov Test of Equality of Pre-Invention 
Distributions of Average Daily Consumption by Month for Utility A 
Table 3A:  Test of Equality of Monthly ITT and Control Distributions 
During Pre-Invention Period for Utility A 
Number in Control Group = 11,500 
Number in ITT Group = 13,500 
Month of 2011 KS Statistic P-Value 
January 0.0137 0.193 
February 0.0172 0.051 
March 0.0131 0.236 
April 0.0170 0.052 
May 0.0152 0.115 
June  0.0149 0.126 
July 0.0167 0.061 
Table 3B:  Test of Equality of Monthly Treatment and ITT-But-
Declined Treatment Distributions During  
Pre-Intervention Period for Utility A 
Number in Treatment Group = 1,227 
Number in ITT-But-Declined Treatment Group = 12,273 
Month of 2011 KS Statistic P-Value 
January 0.0238 0.551 
February 0.0303 0.256 
March 0.0296 0.283 
April 0.0265 0.415 
May 0.0318 0.208 
June  0.0195 0.789 












Table 4:   Kolomogorov-Smirnov Test of Equality of Pre-Invention 
Distributions of Average Daily Consumption by Month for Utility B 
Table 4A:  Test of Equality of Monthly ITT and Control Distributions 
During Pre-Invention Period for Utility B 




May 0.0232 0.742 993 6,461 
June 0.0234 0.732 996 6,474 
July 0.0175 0.968 914 5,986 
August 0.0223 0.823 916 5,997 
September 0.0284 0.542 917 5,992 
Table 4B:  Test of Equality of Monthly Treatment and ITT-But-
Declined Treatment Distributions During  
Pre-Intervention Period for Utility B 






May 0.0531 0.038 783 5,678 
June 0.0455 0.110 782 5,692 
July 0.0551 0.033 747 5,239 
August  0.0581 0.005 747 5,250 











Table 5-1:  Overall and Tier-Specific Treatment Effects  
Estimates for Utility A  
Overall Treatment Effect 
Variable  Estimate Standard Error 
Treat -0.723 0.082 
Constant -0.668 0.019 
Tier 1 Treatment Effect
Treat 0.136 0.060 
Constant -0.184 0.040 
Tier 2 Treatment Effect 
Treat -0.483 0.175 
Constant -0.291 0.046 
Tier 3 Treatment Effect
Treat -0.461 0.134 
Constant -0.528 0.032 
Tier 4 Treatment Effect
Treat -0.912 0.155 
Constant -0.786 0.378 
Tier 5 Treatment Effect
Treat -1.201 0.220 










Table 5-2:  Overall and Tier-Specific Local Average Treatment Effects  
Estimates for Utility A Using ITT Indicator as Instrument 
Overall Treatment Effect 
Variable  Estimate Standard Error 
Treat -12.77 0.516 
Constant -0.621 0.025 
Tier 1 Treatment Effect
Treat 1.136 0.051 
Constant -0.184 0.056 
Tier 2 Treatment Effect 
Treat -5.32 0.974 
Constant -0.043 0.060 
Tier 3 Treatment Effect
Treat -9.84 0.842 
Constant -0.072 0.042 
Tier 4 Treatment Effect
Treat -14.39 1.024 
Constant -0.070 0.051 
Tier 5 Treatment Effect
Treat -22.31 1.635 








Table 6-1:  Overall and Tier-Specific Average Treatment  
Effects Estimates for Utility B 
Overall Treatment Effect 
Variable  Estimate Standard Error 
Treat -0.328 0.282 
Constant -4.830 0.084 
Tier 1 Treatment Effect
Treat 0.670 0.271 
Constant -3.077 0.086 
Tier 2 Treatment Effect 
Treat -1.922 0.419 
Constant -6.276 0.128 
 
 
Table 6-2:  Overall and Tier-Specific Local Average Treatment Effects  
Estimates for Utility B Using ITT Indicator as Instrument 
Overall Treatment Effect 
Variable  Estimate Standard Error 
Treat -1.712 1.834 
Constant -4.676 0.218 
Tier 1 Treatment Effect
Treat 1.509 1.710 
Constant -3.183 0.234 
Tier 2 Treatment Effect 
Treat -5.122 3.200 





Figure 1:   IBT for Utility A Inland Customers 
 








Figure 3:  Densities of Post- Minus Pre-Intervention Average 
Consumption for Treatment and Control plus ITT-But-Declined 






Figure 4-1:  Densities of Post- Minus Pre-Intervention Average Consumption for Tier 1 
Treatment and Control plus ITT-But-Declined Treatment Samples for Utility A 
 
 
Figure 4-2:  Densities of Post- Minus Pre-Intervention Average Consumption for Tier 2 




Figure 4-3:  Densities of Post- Minus Pre-Intervention Average Consumption for Tier 3 
Treatment and Control plus ITT-But-Declined Treatment Samples for Utility A 
 
 
Figure 4-4:  Densities of Post- Minus Pre-Intervention Average Consumption for Tier 4 







Figure 4-5:  Densities of Post- Minus Pre-Intervention Average Consumption for Tier 5 















Figure 5:  Densities of Post- Minus Pre-Intervention Average Consumption for 









Figure 6-1:  Densities of Post- Minus Pre-Intervention Average Consumption for Tier 1 
Treatment and Control plus ITT-But-Declined Treatment Samples for Utility B 
 
Figure 6-2:  Densities of Post- Minus Pre-Intervention Average Consumption for Tier 2 








Dear [insert name], 
 
Utility A is partnering with researchers from Stanford University and UCLA to 
develop a home energy savings workshop. Your valuable input will help Utility A 
create similar educational tools in the future. This online workshop is a 15-20 
minute tutorial that could help you save money on your next electricity bill. For 
completing the workshop, you will receive a $50 gift card to Amazon.com. 
 
The workshop starts by showing how your electricity use affects your electricity 
bill. Then, using a brief survey of your customer’s characteristics, the workshop 
generates the customized suggestions you can use to reduce your customer’s 
electricity bills.  
 
We hope you will try this innovative program today. To begin the workshop 
simply click the link below or paste it into your browser. If you have any 
questions, please contact me at the number below. 
 
[insert link]  






P.S.  You will receive your Amazon Gift Card by e-mail within 10 days of 
completing the survey.  If you do not receive the card within this time period, 
please check your spam filter.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
